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Abstract—An increasing amount of Internet traffic has its
content encrypted. We address the question of whether it is
possible to predict the activities taking place over an encrypted
channel, in particular Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol.
We show that the presence of five typical activities can be
detected with precision greater than 97% and recall greater
than 94% in 30-second traces. We also show that the design of
the protocol exposes fine-grained actions such as keystrokes and
mouse movements which may be leveraged to reveal properties
such as lengths of passwords.
I. INTRODUCTION
One response to the obvious security weaknesses of net-
works is to encrypt the payloads of packet traffic. It was
estimated in 2018 that encryption was used in more than 70%
of network communications [21] but the rate of penetration is
quite variable because of the cost and complexity of public key
infrastructure, particularly for small enterprises. We explore
the question of how much can be detected about interactions,
even when payloads are encrypted. In particular, we are
concerned with activity detection: what is a user doing?
There are some legitimate reasons to be able to answer this
question: determining usage to insure adequate provisioning,
for example. It is also important to know how much an
adversary could infer [34]. We focus on the Microsoft Remote
Desktop Protocol (RDP), a popular protocol that provides an
encrypted channel between a client and a host, allowing remote
work on the host [10]. Five major interactions occur between
client and host: file download, browsing on the host (i.e. a
mixture of viewing, typing, and using the mouse), using an
editor on the host, watching a video, and copying content from
host to client or vice versa using the clipboard.
We show that, even though all traffic is encrypted, it
is possible to detect which of these activities is underway
from the traffic properties, even if two or more simultaneous
activities are occurring. A heterogeneous ensemble classifier
achieves precision greater than 97% and recall greater than
94%. We also discover that there are markers in the protocol
that are directly related to fine-grained user actions.
II. RELATED WORK
Traffic inspection and classification has two main purposes:
security (detecting malicious activity [25]), and quality of
service management (insuring resources are appropriate for
traffic [23]). Traffic analysis can be done using: port structure
(services being used) [9], deep packet inspection (signatures
in payloads) [9], data analytics (per-packet or per-flow) [5], or
behavioral classification (communication pattern graphs) [5].
To overcome the weaknesses associated with the port-
based and payload-based approaches, data analytics has been
proposed as a solution for network traffic classification [2],
[13]. In particular, data-analytic approaches can detect novel
traffic using anomaly detection [33].
Draper-Gil et al. [11] generated a dataset used by several
researchers to predict traffic classes. It contains browsing,
email, chat, streaming, file transfer, VoIP, and P2P traffic; each
inside and outside of a VPN tunnel. However, each window
contains only a single kind of traffic. Draper-Gil used k-
Nearest Neighbor and decision tree predictors; Saber et al.
[26] used under- and over-sampling, PCA, SVMs; Lotfollahi
et al. [19] used stacked autoencoders and convolutional neural
networks; and Vu et al. [30] used LSTMs. The best models on
this dataset achieve F1 scores up to 0.98 on the single-class
prediction problem.
Zhang et al. [32], in the closest work to ours, classify
categories of seven types of activities: Browsing, Chat, On-
line Gaming, Downloading, Uploading, Online Video, and
BitTorrent, using windows of different sizes. However, each
window contains at most two simultaneous kinds of traffic.
They achieve around 80% prediction accuracy for 5-second
windows and over 90% accuracy for 1-minute traffic windows
for the single class problem. Their accuracy decreases for some
classes when there are two concurrent activities.
A finer-grained, and harder, version of the problem is to
detect not only the kind of traffic but which application is
being used. Taylor et al. [28] create an “Appscanner” tool to
recognize smartphone apps in encrypted traffic. Their work
was later improved by Taylor et al. [29] using bursts, packets
grouped within a time window. They analyze one second
bursts to deliver near real-time prediction for 110 out of 200
most popular free Google Play applications. Alan and Kaur
[1] reduce computational complexity by analyzing only the
first 64 packets to identify the application. Saltaformaggio
et al. [27] achieve an average of 78% precision and 76%
recall using KMeans and multi-class SVM and properties that
could be captured by eavesdropping. In addition, they also
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paid attention to how easy it was to discover user properties
from the traffic, and revealed some major privacy issues.
Application identification is also possible in encrypted tunnels.
Lotfollahi et al. [19] and Yamansavascilar et al. [31] run their
experiments on the same VPN dataset by Draper-Gil et al.
[11] to detect application instead of the broad traffic category.
A related problem is to detect what actions users are doing
on their devices, that is behavioral detection. Conti et al. [7]
analyze encrypted traffic from Android devices to discover
user behaviors such as sending a new message with Gmail or
opening the Dropbox app. Their study included seven Android
applications: Facebook, Gmail, Twitter, Tumblr, Dropbox,
Google+ and Evernote and they simulated user actions to
obtain signatures of flows generated by use of these apps.
Coull and Dyer analyze user behaviors in Apple iMessage
[8] and showed that users’ actions, as well as language and
length of messages exchanged, can be predicted. Park and
Kim [24] predict KakaoTalk’s eleven behaviors in encrypted
traffic. Liu et al. [18] predict whether a user is using Wechat,
WhatsApp and Facebook and behaviors such as voice calling,
video calling or picture sharing. Dubin et al. [12] trained a
classifier to predict the most popular YouTube videos titles,
basing on encrypted traffic statistics, notably the bits per peak.
III. APPROACH
A real-world system was used to collect RDP traffic data
about five classes of traffic. Derived data were computed
from the base traffic data using Discrete Cosine Transform,
singular value decomposition, and independent component
analysis. A series of predictive models were then built and
their performance assessed using standard measures as well
as a custom measure designed for the problem.
A. System setup
The Remote Desktop Protocol is designed to let a user at a
client interact with a host as if sitting at that host. It provides
the full interactivity of using the mouse, viewing the screen,
and using the keyboard.
The client workstation, called Workstation01, is a 6-core
Intel Xeon processor, 36 GB memory, 2 TB storage and
Network Interface Card connected to a Local Area Network
with an Internet gateway, running Microsoft Windows 10
Professional. For data analysis, Java Runtime Environment
1.8 was installed to run CIC FlowMeter v4.0 for attribute
extraction, and Wireshark to capture RDP network traffic into
.pcap files. As a Remote Desktop client, Workstation01 is
configured to mount local drives, allow clipboard and runs
in resolution 1366x768 with full user desktop experience.
Hyper-V service is enabled on Workstation01 for virtualiza-
tion and there are two virtual machines running on it: Win01
and Centos-Miner. Win01 VM is a plain installation of a
Windows 10 Professional 1809 virtual machine that acts as
a Remote Desktop host. The VM is configured with 4 virtual
cores and 8 GB of RAM. It has a static IP, Network Level
Authentication, and a Windows firewall with an exception
allowing incoming RDP traffic. This setup ensures that Work-
station01 can connect freely to Win01 VM over both TCP and
UDP protocols on port 3389.
CentOS-Miner is a CentOS 7.5 VM running on top of
Workstation-01 Hyper-V. This Linux virtual machine has a
Bash environment and Tshark installed and it is used for data
exploration and additional attribute extraction.
A physically remote VM, CAC01, is hosted at Queen’s Uni-
versity’s Centre for Advanced Computing. The configuration is
exactly the same as for Win01 VM except that it runs Windows
10 Education, and resides behind a firewall with NAT. CAC-01
has 4 virtual cores and 4 GB of RAM.
Traffic to Win01 is on the same IP subnet as the client, and
only encounters the built-in Windows firewall on Win01 itself.
Traffic to CAC01 passes through an Internet connection, the
Queen’s University campus network, and a physical firewall
that accepts connections on port 13389 and forwards them to
CAC01 on port 3389. RDP uses TCP only for traffic outside
a subnet, and a mixture of TCP and UDP for traffic within a
subnet, so two different predictive models had to be developed.
Figure 1 shows the network setup with all the Virtual
Machines used for data generation. The red path shows the
traffic path for the local subnet scenario and the green path
represents the distant scenario, traversing the Internet.
B. Data Collection
The Remote Desktop traffic attributes were captured for
30 second windows of one or more of the following activity
classes:
• Download – file download from host to client;
• Browsing – using a browser (Firefox and Chrome) on the
host, driven from the client;
• Notepad – editing on the host from the client (typing for
more than 80% of the time window);
• YouTube – playing a video on the host (Youtube or
mp4s), viewed on the client; and
• Clipboard – copying content from remote system to local
using the clipboard mechanism.
Samples may be pure – a single activity for 30 seconds – or
mixed, with up to four activities simultaneously in a 30-second
window.
Attribute collection is performed by CIC Flow Meter and
Tshark. The former is a tool developed by University of New
Brunswick’s Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity [16]. CIC
Flow Meter extracts a predefined number of attributes for
each network traffic conversation from a .pcap file. There will
be one conversation for TCP only traffic samples, and two
conversations for TCP and UDP traffic samples. Predictive
attributes include properties such as packet lengths, inter-
arrival times and TCP SYN flag counts.
A Bash script extracts additional meaningful predictive
attributes from the packet-level attributes of Tshark. The
additional attributes include Packet Length Statistics from
Wireshark, as shown in Figure 2, and include attributes dis-
covered during exploratory data analysis. All of the data is
preprocessed to insure that forward always refers to traffic
Fig. 1. Network architecture diagram
Fig. 2. Wireshark – packet length statistics
from local to remote, and backward the converse, based on IP
addresses.
Several derived attributes of the measured traffic attributes
were also computed. The Discrete Cosine Transform expresses
a sequence as a sum of cosine functions. It has often been
observed that a single component of the DCT integrates the
variability within a sequence [22]. We compute this value
for each row of the dataset, that is for the collected traffic
attributes of each traffic flow.
Singular Value Decomposition is an affine transformation
of a vector space into a form where the greatest variability
is captured by the first few axes of the transformed space.
Truncation of the SVD amounts to a projection of a high-
dimensional space into a low-dimensional one in a way that
preserves maximal variation. We apply SVD to the matrix of
windows × traffic attributes and keep the first 20 columns of
the left singular vector matrix.
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) [15] is another
matrix transformation that decomposes a matrix into statisti-
cally independent components. We apply ICA to the windows
TABLE I
ATTRIBUTES
Attributes
ACK Flag Cnt
Active Max
Active Mean
Active Min
Active Std
Bwd Blk Rate Avg
Bwd Byts/b Avg
Bwd Header Len
Bwd IAT Max
Bwd IAT Mean
Bwd IAT Min
Bwd IAT Std
Bwd IAT Tot
Bwd PSH Flags
Bwd Pkt Len Max
Bwd Pkt Len Mean
Bwd Pkt Len Min
Bwd Pkt Len Std
Bwd Pkts/b Avg
Bwd Pkts/s
Bwd Seg Size Avg
Bwd URG Flags
CWE Flag Count
ECE Flag Cnt
FIN Flag Cnt
Flow Byts/s
Flow Duration
Flow IAT Max
Flow IAT Mean
Flow IAT Min
Flow IAT Std
Flow Pkts/s
Fwd Blk Rate Avg
Fwd Byts/b Avg
Fwd Header Len
Fwd IAT Max
Fwd IAT Mean
Fwd IAT Min
Fwd IAT Std
Fwd IAT Tot
Fwd PSH Flags
Fwd Pkt Len Max
Fwd Pkt Len Mean
Fwd Pkt Len Min
Fwd Pkt Len Std
Fwd Pkts/b Avg
Fwd Pkts/s
Fwd Seg Size Avg
Fwd URG Flags
Idle Max
Idle Mean
Idle Min
Idle Std
Init Bwd Win Byts
Init Fwd Win Byts
PSH Flag Cnt
Pkt Len Max
Pkt Len Mean
Pkt Len Min
Pkt Len Std
Pkt Len Var
Pkt Size Avg
RST Flag Cnt
SYN Flag Cnt
Subflow Bwd Byts
Subflow Bwd Pkts
Subflow Fwd Byts
Subflow Fwd Pkts
Tot Bwd Pkts
Tot Fwd Pkts
TotLen Bwd Pkts
TotLen Fwd Pkts
URG Flag Cnt
FwdFrame91-93
FwdFrame80-91
FwdFrame90-94
FwdFrame96-98
FwdFrame103-105
FwdFrame1280-2559
BwdFrame40-79
BwdFrame80-159
BwdFrame160-319
BwdFrame320-639
BwdFrame640-1279
BwdFrame1280-2559
BwdPUSH
FwdPUSH
dct col
svd0
svd1
svd2
svd3
svd4
svd5
svd6
svd7
svd8
svd9
svd10
svd11
svd12
svd13
svd14
svd15
svd16
svd17
svd18
svd19
ica0
ica1
ica2
ica3
ica4
ica5
ica6
ica7
ica8
ica9
ica10
ica11
ica12
ica13
ica14
ica15
ica16
ica17
ica18
ica19
× traffic attributes and select the 20 columns of the left
decomposition matrix1.
The final predictive attribute set is shown in Table I.
Shapley Values calculate the contributions to a final result
1There are a number of sophisticated ways to select the most important
columns, for example those with maximal kurtosis, but we retain the first 20
and leave it to attribute selection to find the best.
made by individual players in a game theory context [17].
They have been successfully applied to attribute selection in
predictors because of the development of fast approximation
algorithms that avoid the implicit exponential number of
attribute combinations to be evaluated. The two most popular
Shapley value explainers are TreeExplainer [20], for tree-based
predictors, and DeepExplainer, for neural networks predictors.
We use Shapley values for attribute selection. The selection
process is run independently five times, each time for a
different class. Shapley Values were computed with two differ-
ent classification techniques as the backend: Neural Network
(Deep Explainer) and Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost).
C. Individual Techniques and the Ensemble Predictor
For predictors, we use k-Nearest Neighbors, Support Vector
Machines [3], decision trees, random forests [4], Adaboost
[14], XGBoost [6], and multilayer perceptrons.
Each of the prediction techniques was run with 10-fold cross
validation, with binary class labels (traffic class present or
not). The final ensemble model consists of the top three most
effective classifiers for each traffic class, chosen to maximize
the precision, so that the ensemble classifier can determine
with a high degree of certainty whenever a specific kind of
traffic is present. A specific sample is predicted to contain a
specific class of traffic when at least two of the three classifiers
predict that class.
The output of the ensemble classifier is 5 binary values,
predicting the presence of each of the 5 kinds of traffic in the
sample. Three different performance measures are calculated:
• The precision, recall and F1 score for each class;
• A confusion matrix for each class;
• An ensemble score function designed for the problem
domain.
The ensemble score function assigns points to each record as
follows:
• For a true negative, no points;
• For a true positive, add one point;
• For a false positive, subtract two points;
• For a false negative, no points.
For instance, if the model predicts download and clipboard,
where the traffic actually contained download and browsing,
it will assign +1 point for download, 0 points for browsing as
it was a false negative, 0 points for Notepad and YouTube
as they were true negatives, and −2 for false positive on
clipboard. The aggregate of scores calculated on all test set
rows is divided by the sum of all positive labels in the test set
and multiplied by 100. The scoring function severely penalizes
the ensemble whenever it predicts a traffic class that is not
actually present. This insures that the model is reliable for
predicting behavior.
D. Dataset
The dataset consists of 2160 30-second data samples. The
information relating to number of samples is summarized
in Table II for the CAC-01 (Remote VM, TCP transport)
and Table III for Win01 (Local subnet VM, TCP and UDP
transport) traffic respectively. For simplicity, we will refer to
the first kind of traffic as TCP and to the latter as UDP.
When TCP is the only protocol used, it is easier to make
accurate predictions. When UDP is added, the problem com-
plexity grows because there are at least two conversations –
one for the TCP stream and one for the UDP stream, in the
same Remote Desktop session. UDP seems to be used for
bulk transfers while TCP is used to send user inputs, such as
keystrokes and mouse movements, and perhaps RDP session
management details.
Every keystroke that is sent from local system to the remote
system over Remote Desktop is carried by two 92-byte TCP
frames in the forward direction. As a result, the total number of
92-byte frames in a window reveals how many keystrokes have
been sent (except that actions such as pressing and holding a
Shift key generates 92-byte frames, until the key is released).
The remote system also responds with packets that are re-
vealing. 92-byte upward packets produce PSH-flagged packets
whose payload size correlates with the visual change to the
screen of the character echo – the more pixels changed, the
larger the payload2. This suggests a potential attack against
passwords, since the echoed character is typically not the
character sent but a filler character. As a result, entering a
password may produce an easily detectable signature.
Mouse movements generate packets of either 97 or 104
bytes, with 97-byte packets associated with mouse clicks.
Observing the number of such packets allows mouse activity
to be estimated; and the mixing with 92-byte packets allows
even finer grained estimates – for example, the size of form
data might be estimated by observing how many characters are
typed in between mouse clicks and small mouse movements.
IV. RESULTS
Attribute ranking is computed for ten cases: 5 TCP activ-
ities and 5 UDP activities, and for each both the tree-based
and neural-net based Shapley value computation. This results
in twenty ranked lists of attribute significance. Tree based
Shapley values also provide information about whether an
attribute is associated with one class label or the other, and
how strongly. These are shown as red and blue points in plots.
The most predictive attributes are fairly consistent using
both the tree-based and network-based Shapley values. The
92- and 104-byte attributes rank highly, as do many of the
SVD components, suggesting that the original attributes tend
to capture traffic properties that are strongly correlated.
Table IV shows the best attributes for the TCP traffic classes
and Table V shows the best attributes for the UDP traffic
classes.
Table VI shows the performance summary for the predictors
run on the TCP traffic and Table VII summarizes performance
for the UDP traffic. Accuracies are over 10-fold cross valida-
tion.
2There are hints that what is being returned is the delta of the character
being displayed.
TABLE II
TOTAL TCP SAMPLES COUNT
Num samples Download? Browsing? Notepad? YouTube? Clipboard?
240 1 0 0 0 0
240 0 1 0 0 0
239 0 0 1 0 0
243 0 0 0 1 0
120 0 0 0 0 1
74 0 1 0 0 1
43 1 1 0 0 0
25 1 0 1 0 1
22 1 0 1 0 0
62 0 0 1 1 0
27 1 0 0 1 0
63 0 1 0 1 0
22 0 0 1 0 1
15 1 1 0 0 1
21 1 0 1 1 1
1456 TOTAL
TABLE III
TOTAL UDP SAMPLES COUNT
Num samples Download? Browsing? Notepad? YouTube? Clipboard?
103 1 0 0 0 0
92 0 1 0 0 0
100 0 0 1 0 0
105 0 0 0 1 0
100 0 0 0 0 1
42 0 1 0 0 1
44 0 1 0 1 0
42 1 0 1 0 0
37 1 0 1 0 1
39 1 0 0 1 0
704 TOTAL
TABLE IV
SELECTED ATTRIBUTE SETS FOR TCP CLASSES
TCP Download TCP Browsing TCP Notepad TCP YouTube TCP Clipboard
svd0
BwdFrame80-159
BwdFrame320-639
Init Fwd Win Byts
Tot Fwd Pkts
BwdFrame640-1279
Fwd IAT Mean
Pkt Len Std
Bwd IAT Max
ica19
Bwd Pkt Len Mean
Flow Byts/s
FwdFrame103-105
BwdFrame320-639
Fwd Pkt Len Mean
Fwd Seg Size Avg
svd8
BwdPUSH
FwdFrame96-98
FwdPUSH
BwdFrame1280-2559
ica7
FwdFrame91-93
Init Fwd Win Byts
Bwd Pkt Len Mean
svd2
FwdFrame91-93
svd0
FwdPUSH
BwdFrame80-159
BwdFrame320-639
svd1
svd6
svd0
svd9
FwdPUSH
TotLen Fwd Pkts
Flow IAT Std
BwdFrame640-1279
FwdPUSH
svd1
svd0
Subflow Bwd Byts
ica7
FwdFrame91-93
FwdFrame103-105
svd6
ica11
svd11
ica5
Fwd Pkt Len Mean
BwdFrame320-639
svd8
Pkt Len Std
For each TCP and UDP traffic class we select the top three
best performing cross-validated predictors to build two ensem-
ble predictors – the TCP Ensemble and the UDP Ensemble,
shown in Figures 7 and 8.
Table VIII provides the True Positives, False Positives, True
Negatives, and False Negatives with five-fold cross-validation
for the ensemble predictors. We then calculate Accuracy,
Precision, Recall and F1 score.
Table IX, summarizes the single ensemble scores obtained
for each fold of the TCP and UDP models, along with
the average. Voting makes a significant contribution towards
reducing false positives.
For both UDP and TCP traffic, there are similarities when it
comes to the most commonly misclassified traffic classes. For
both TCP and UDP traffic, the most common misclassification
misses the Clipboard class. This is reflected in the recall scores
for the UDP Clipboard at only 94.97% and the TCP Clipboard
at 95.67%, while other classes all have recall higher than 98%.
The most common error in TCP traffic is a mixture of
Browsing and Clipboard being classified as Browsing only.
Both Browsing and Clipboard involve mouse movements and
mouse clicks, both right- and left-clicks, but it seems slightly
TABLE V
SELECTED ATTRIBUTE SETS FOR UDP CLASSES
UDP Download UDP Browsing UDP Notepad UDP YouTube UDP Clipboard
svd0
svd1
svd2
Fwd Pkt Len Std
Bwd Header Len
svd1
Fwd Pkt Len Std
FwdFrame96-98
svd0
svd5
FwdFrame90-94
BwdFrame320-639
FwdFrame91-93
BwdFrame40-79
svd2
Fwd IAT Min
svd1
Bwd IAT Mean
svd1
svd0
svd3
svd5
BwdFrame80-159
FwdFrame91-93
Flow IAT Max
Bwd IAT Max
Fwd Pkt Len Mean
Fwd Seg Size Avg
BwdFrame320-639
Bwd IAT Std
Fwd IAT Max
svd4
Bwd Header Len
ica8
Bwd Pkt Len Max
Fwd IAT Tot
Bwd IAT Tot
svd2
Bwd IAT Std
Fwd IAT Mean
FwdFrame103-105
Flow IAT Mean
Flow IAT Std
BwdFrame40-79
BwdFrame320-639
Bwd IAT Mean
FwdFrame91-93
Pkt Len Mean
FwdFrame90-94
Fwd IAT Min
TABLE VI
TCP TRAFFIC INDIVIDUAL TECHNIQUES – ACCURACY AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Technique Download Browsing Notepad YouTube Clipboard
NN 99.66%(± 0.46%)
98.62%
(± 1.27%)
99.66%
(± 0.46%)
99.59%
(± 0.46%)
95.88%
(± 1.23%)
RF 99.18%(± 0.79%)
99.38%
(± 0.57%)
99.86%
(± 0.27%)
99.59%
(± 0.46%)
98.69%
(± 0.84%)
XGB 99.52%(± 0.69%)
99.59%
(± 0.62%)
99.72%
(± 0.46%)
99.59%
(± 0.45%)
98.56%
(± 1.12%)
SVM 99.73%(± 0.34%)
99.24%
(± 0.72%)
99.86%
(± 0.28%)
99.59%
(± 0.45%)
95.47%
(± 2.60%)
Ada 99.66%(± 0.46%)
99.25%
(± 0.57%)
99.86%
(± 0.28%)
99.52%
(± 0.81%)
98.49%
(± 0.67%)
KNN 99.45%(± 0.51%)
99.04%
(± 0.70%)
99.79%
(± 0.31%)
99.31%
(± 0.68%)
94.71%
(± 1.81%)
DTC 98.63%(± 0.86%)
98.83%
(± 0.75%)
99.93%
(± 0.21%)
99.52%
(± 0.69%)
96.91%
(± 1.20%)
surprising that these are difficult to distinguish.
The second most common error occurs when Browsing traf-
fic is classified as Browsing and Clipboard, generating a false
positive prediction for Clipboard. The third most common is
for the combination of Download, Browsing and Clipboard
where the Clipboard traffic is missed. The fourth most com-
mon is when a Download and YouTube mixture is classified
as Download only. Misclassifications are rare the other way
– mixtures of the two rarely get classified as YouTube only.
Download has a potential to dominate YouTube, apparently
because it generates significantly more and faster traffic; and
it is possible that backward (remote to local) packet lengths
could vary, especially when traversing the Internet. This could
be caused by TCP adjusting the window size for transfers.
Interestingly, there were no misclassifications relating to the
4-class TCP traffic.
For UDP traffic, the most common misclassification is again
a False negative for the Clipboard class. Most often, this
happens in the mixture of Download, Notepad and Clipboard,
where Clipboard is missed and traffic is classified as Download
and Notepad. Both Download and Notepad have many more
visible traffic attributes than Clipboard does – the total number
of backward bytes for Download and 92-byte frames for
Notepad. There were some other misclassifications such as
Browsing and Clipboard being identified as Browsing alone
and Clipboard or Browsing being classified as none of the
five classes.
We wondered if Browsing samples from web sites with lots
of video and dynamic content would tend to get misclassified
as the YouTube class. Such misclassifications are rare and the
predictive model is apparently resilient to audio and video
contents embedded in websites.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that, for an encrypted protocol such as RDP,
it is still possible to infer five common categories of activities
with high reliability from traffic properties that cannot be
concealed by encryption. It is conceivable that some of these
predictions could be defeated by obfuscation in the protocol
but protocol designers are caught between the need to conceal
activity and the need to provide responsiveness. As we have
shown, this has led to a design in which keystrokes, mouse
TABLE VII
UDP TRAFFIC INDIVIDUAL TECHNIQUES – ACCURACY AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Technique Download Browsing Notepad YouTube Clipboard
NN 99.86%(± 0.42%)
97.72%
(± 1.93%)
99.71%
(± 0.57%)
99.86%
(± 0.42%)
96.02%
(± 2.09%)
RF 99.86%(± 0.42%)
99.29%
(± 0.71%)
99.43%
(± 0.69%)
100.00%
(± 0.00%)
98.15%
(± 1.28%)
XGB 99.57%(± 0.91%)
99.01%
(± 0.90%)
98.72%
(± 1.34%)
99.15%
(± 0.95%)
97.87%
(± 1.30%)
SVM 99.71%(± 0.57%)
98.29%
(± 1.39%)
99.72%
(± 0.57%)
99.43%
(± 0.69%)
95.03%
(± 2.73%)
Ada 99.57%(± 0.65%)
99.01%
(± 0.91%)
99.57%
(± 0.65%)
99.71%
(± 0.86%)
98.44%
(± 1.00%)
KNN 99.86%(± 0.42%)
98.01%
(± 1.45%)
99.72%
(± 0.56%)
99.01%
(± 1.11%)
94.45%
(± 2.17%)
DTC 99.86%(± 0.42%)
98.87%
(± 1.76%)
99.58%
(± 0.65%)
98.86%
(± 1.06%)
96.60%
(± 1.69%)
TABLE VIII
SUMMARY OF EACH TCP AND UDP TRAFFIC CLASS RESULTS OVER 5-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION
Class FP TP FN TN Accu. Prec. Rec. F1
TCP Download 1 391 2 1062 99.79 99.74 99.49 99.62
TCP Browsing 3 434 1 1018 99.73 99.31 99.77 99.54
TCP Notepad 0 390 1 1065 99.93 100.00 99.74 99.87
TCP YouTube 2 413 3 1038 99.66 99.52 99.28 99.40
TCP Clipboard 5 265 12 1174 98.83 98.15 95.67 96.89
UDP Download 0 221 0 483 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
UDP Browsing 2 175 3 524 99.29 98.87 98.31 98.59
UDP Notepad 1 178 1 524 99.72 99.44 99.44 99.44
UDP YouTube 0 188 0 516 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
UDP Clipboard 4 170 9 521 98.15 97.70 94.97 96.32
TABLE IX
SINGLE ENSEMBLE SCORE RESULTS
Fold TCP Ensemble Score UDP Ensemble Score
1 98.18 95.36
2 97.86 97.47
3 97.19 97.85
4 97.95 96.22
5 98.13 98.90
Average 97.86 97.16
activity, and visual rendering all leave traces in the encrypted
traffic which could potentially be used for attacks.
A limitation of this model is that it only used traffic between
Windows 10 systems. Different systems, and RDP updates,
could conceivably change traffic structure in a macroscopic
way, although the proof of concept here suggests that only
model retraining would be needed. Other kinds of traffic were
not examined: for example, two-way video such as Zoom or
Skype might induce quite different traffic structure.
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